Business climate, productivity, and competitiveness in Armenia: 2002\u20132005 by Iarossi, Giuseppe et al.
 
  
Working paper No. 06/06 
 
Business Climate, Productivity, and Competitiveness in Armenia:  
2002-2005 
 
Giuseppe Iarossi Federica Saliola Giovanni Tanzillo 
World Bank World Bank and 
University of Rome III 
World Bank 
giarossi@worldbank.org  saliola@uniroma3.it  gtanzillo@worldbank.org  
 
January 2006 
 
Abstract 
Armenia’s impressive economic performance of the last few years is not sustainable in the long 
run unless reforms to improve the Investment Climate are implemented. Using data from a survey 
of 8800 entrepreneurs in East Europe and Central Asia, this paper compares the Investment 
Climate in Armenia to that of 23 other countries in the region and identifies which features have 
contributed to the relative decline of Armenia’s business climate over the last 3 years. The major 
business obstacles to private sector development are investigated and their impact on firm 
performance is established. Evidence is presented that red tape, access to finance and corruption 
remain the main impediments to productivity growth in Armenia. Finally the paper establishes an 
order of priority of reforms and investigates Armenia’s competitiveness with countries in the 
region. The analysis shows that red tape is the main Investment Climate constraint affecting firm 
performance in Armenia and that a better access to long term finance, both in terms of bank 
lending and trade credit, would help bridge the 40% productivity gap with Turkey. 
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Section 1. Investment Climate Dynamics in Armenia: 2002-2005 
 
1.1 Introduction 
The past few years have witnessed a renewed interest in the micro determinants of 
economic growth. Recent cross country evidence has found little correlation between 
capital accumulation and growth. Because of decreasing marginal returns investment 
rates by themselves are not the drivers of growth. As emphasized by the recent 2005 
World Development Report: A Better Investment Climate for Everyone (World Bank, 
2004) it is the quality of the investments, and hence their productivity, that will sustain 
growth in the long run. Having a good investment climate is key to sustained growth and 
poverty reduction because the quality of the business environment has an impact on the 
productivity of the investments.  
 
There is no precise definition of Investment Climate. By many it is seen as the set of 
“location-specific factors shaping the opportunities and incentives for firms to invest 
productively, create jobs, and expand.”1 Consequently improving the investment climate 
in a country translates into enhancing its institutional and physical infrastructure that 
mold the opportunities and incentives for firms to grow and create jobs.  
 
As firms interact with many aspects of the institutional and physical environment of the 
host country, improving the investment climate translates into addressing a broad set of 
issues ranging from macro-economic policies (inflation, interest rates, exchange rates and 
taxation) to legal and regulatory framework (corruption, security, labor laws, etc.), to the 
availability and quality of infrastructure services (electricity, transport, telecom, finance 
and human resources). Therefore, an assessment of the investment climate needs to cover 
all these factors to be able to provide a broad picture of the binding constraints to private 
sector development and to help the government identify policies to promote economic 
growth and poverty reduction.  
 
This paper attempts to highlight what aspects of the Investment Climate (IC) in Armenia 
would enhance its productivity and competitiveness. Based on a survey of 350 
entrepreneurs conducted in 2005 this paper highlights the progress made over the last 3 
years in improving the IC and what binding constraints to private sector development in 
Armenia still remain. It starts with an analysis of the evolution in the IC over the period 
                                                 
1 World Development Report 2005, page 20 
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2002-2005 by building a composite Business Climate index (section 1). Armenia’s 
business climate is compared to 23 countries in East Europe and Central Asia (ECA), 
with particular emphasis to Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey. In section 2 the paper 
briefly discusses the major bottlenecks to private sector development in 2005 as 
perceived by Armenian entrepreneurs. The issue of tax evasion is analyzed more in 
detail, and a link between evasion and corruption is established. In the final section of the 
paper we estimate the productivity impact of the top three IC obstacles. The paper 
concludes with an order of the priority of reforms and with an analysis of the impact of 
these reforms on Armenian competitiveness with respect to Turkey. 
 
 
 
1.2 A composite indicator of the Investment Climate: the Business Climate Index 
Because of its broad definition it becomes very hard to identify one or two indicators that 
could meaningfully characterize the investment climate in any country. Generally 
researchers resort to identify the most important aspects in any one country and discuss 
them separately. While this is feasible at one point in time it becomes extremely difficult 
to follow this approach if the analysis of the IC is conducted over time. Therefore in this 
paper we decided to build a composite IC index in order to see the evolution of the IC 
environment in Armenia and the other ECA countries over time. This index will enable 
us to summarize in one indicator the different features of the IC in Armenia and to gauge 
the competitiveness of Armenia’s investment climate in comparison with its neighbors.  
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In building such index we start from the assumption that entrepreneurs look at a wide 
range of features of the business climate in a country, from macroeconomic stance, to 
rule of law, red tape, accessibility of inputs, and infrastructure services. Therefore our 
Business Climate Index (BCI) combines both macro and micro indicators grouped in 4 
categories: macro, infrastructure, inputs, and institutions. Furthermore, within each of 
these 4 categories variables are grouped to measure 2 separate dimensions: cost and 
quality. It is in fact our contention that entrepreneurs often face such a choice in their 
daily operations. As a result 8 sets of variables come to build the BCI aimed at measuring 
the cost and the quality of macro stance, the cost and quality of infrastructure services, 
the cost and quality of input markets, and the cost and quality of the institutions. (Table 
1)  
 
1 Inflation 1 Coefficient of variation of inflation
2 Exchange rate 2 Coefficient of variation of exchange rate
3 Size of domestic market: population 3 Projection of size dom mkt
4 Size of domestic market: gdp per capita 4 Coefficient of variation of interest rate
5 Interest rate 5 Openness (trade as % gdp)
6 Credit available to private sector 6 Capital flows (FDI)
7 Perception of macro instability
8 Corruption Index (Transparency Int'l)
9 Procedures to start a business (number)
10 Time to start a business (days)
11 Cost to start a business (% of income per capita)
12 Min. capital to start a business (% of income pc)
13 Credit Information Index
14 Private credit bureau coverage (% adults)
15 Procedures to enforce a contract (number)
16 Time to enforce a contract (days)
17 Cost to enforce a contract (% of debt)
1 Days of power outages 1 Perception on electricity
2 Days of insufficient water supply 2 Perception on telecom
3 Days of unavailable telephone service 3 Perception on transport
4 Percentage of sales lost in transit 4 Perception on land
5 Perception on land
MACRO VARIABLES
INFRASTRUCTURE
QUALITY
QUALITY
COST
COST
Table 1. Variables used in the construction of the composite Business Climate Index 
(BCI)
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1 Training provided to skilled workers 1 Education of workforce
2 Excess labor 2 Availability of managers
3 Cost of finance 3 Availability of professionals
4 Cost of finance 4 Availability of skilled wkrs
5 Proximity to raw materials (domest) 5 Access to short term finance
6 Proximity to customers (domestic) 6 Access to long term finance
7 Trade credit (net) 7 Loan duration
8 Access to foreign inputs 8 Time to approve loan
9 Access to foreign customers 9 Informality of supplier network
10 Technology (dummy) 10 Perception on access to finance
11 Perception on cost of finance
12 Perception on labor regulations
13 Perception on customs
14 Perception on availability of skills
1 Law & order: security cost 1 Perception of law & order: crime
2 Law & order: protection payments 2 Perception of law & order: mafia
3 Law & order: losses due to theft 3 Perception of corruption
4 Bribes 4 Perception of irreg payments to get things done
5 Govnt contract paidback 5 Perception of judicial system: fairness
6 Judicial inefficiency 6 Perception of judicial system: honesty
7 Manager time with officials 7 Perception of judicial system: speed
8 Tax evasion 8 Perception of judicial system: affordability
9 Days to obtain a telephone connection 9 Perception of judicial system: enforsability
10 Days to obtain a electric connection 10 Perception of functioning of judicial system
11 Perception of political influence of firms
12 Perception of red tape
13 Perception of regulatory uncertainty
14 Value of bus association: resolution of disputes
15 Value of bus association: info on domestic market
16 Value of bus association: info on foreign market
17 Value of bus association: standard accreditation
18 Value of bus association: info on gvnt regulations
19 Quality of administration: info easy to obtain
20 Quality of adm.: consistent interpretation of rules
21 Quality of administration: appeal to superior
22 Perception of tax administration: rates
23 Perception of tax administration: administration
24 Variability of access to foreign inputs
25 Variability of access to foreign customers
26 Degree of competition 
27 Quality of internal management
COST QUALITY
INPUTS
INSTITUTIONS
Table 1(cont'd). Variables used in the construction of the composite 
Business Climate Index (BCI)
QUALITYCOST
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From a methodological point of view, given the heterogeneous nature of each variable the 
BCI is constructed using principle component analysis. Even though applying principle 
component analysis is relatively straightforward, a critical decision in the construction of 
the BCI index refers to how individual components are aggregated into the composite 
indicator. Generally individual components are simply summed up to obtain the overall 
index. This approach, although popular for its simplicity, presents a major drawback. An 
improvement in one dimension compensates an equal shortcoming in another 
(“compensability” effect). In other words, a country that performs already well on one 
dimension of the investment climate can compensate a shortcoming in another dimension 
by improving further the “best” dimension(s) rather than improving the dimension(s) 
where it performs worst. Building a BCI in such a way would reduce the policy relevance 
of our analysis because with such an index a country with a low score on one dimension 
can increase its overall rating by simply improving dimensions were it already has a 
better score. We believe that countries with a better business climate are countries that 
improve all dimensions of their IC. Therefore in our attempt to build an index that 
“rewards” more countries that improve dimensions in which they perform worst, the BCI 
aggregates individual components using the following geometric aggregation model: 
 
tfpm wwww xINSTITindeexINFRASTindINPUTindexMACROindexBCI )()()()( ∗∗∗= [1.1] 
 
where  iw = share of variance explained by each retained factor 
 
The BCI index is constructed by means of a series of 3 separate aggregations. First, the 
variables in each of the 8 sets (macro cost, macro quality, infrastructure cost, 
infrastructure quality, etc.) are combined into 8 indices of macro cost, macro quality, 
infrastructure cost, infrastructure quality, etc. Secondly, these 8 indices are aggregated 
into 4 indices, one for each category: macro, infrastructure, inputs and institutions. Lastly 
Figure 1. First step in the BCI construction 
 
 
Inflation variability
Exchange rate variability
Real interest rate variability
Capital flows
Macro instability
Corruption index
Procedures to start a business
Cost to start a business
Min. capital to start a business
Credit information index
Private bureau coverage
Procedures to enforce contracts
Time to enforce contracts
Cost to enforce contracts
Factor1
Factor2
Factor3
Factor4
(Factor1)    • (Factor2)   • (Factor3)   • (Factor4)     =  MacroQI
VARIABLES
FACTOR
ANALYSIS AGGREGATION INDEX
W1 W2 W3 W4
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these 4 indices are combined into the BCI, as described in [1.1]. At each stage of the 
aggregation process principal components and geometric aggregation is employed.  
 
To show the procedure followed in the creation of the BCI let us take the macro variables 
as an example. We have 6 variables representing the cost dimension and 17 variables 
characterizing the quality dimension. At the first stage, the first group of variables, say 
quality of macro stance, is combined into an index of macro quality. Applying principal 
component analysis to these 17 variables generates 4 factors (Factor1, Factor2, Factor3, 
Factor4). In order to obtain the Macro 
Quality Index (MacroQI) we combine these 
factors using geometric aggregation with 
weights corresponding to the share of the 
variance explained by each of the 4 factors2. 
(Figure 1). The same process is repeated for 
all other 7 groups of variables. Similarly in 
the second stage we combine, for each 
category, the cost and quality indices into 4 
indices of macro, infrastructure, inputs and 
institutions. Within each category we have 2 
factors aggregated geometrically as described 
above. Finally the 4 indices are again 
combined together to form the BCI as 
described in figure 2. 
 
                                                 
2 The weights are normalized to 1. 
Figure 2 Second and third step in the BCI construction 
 
 
 
Country 2002 2005
1 Albania 170 204
2 Armenia 171 351
3 Azerbaijan 170 350
4 Belarus 250 325
5 Bosnia-Herz. 182 200
6 Bulgaria 250 300
7 Croatia 187 236
8 Czech Rep. 268 343
9 Estonia 170 219
10 Macedonia 170 200
11 Georgia 174 200
12 Hungary 250 610
13 Kazakhstan 250 585
14 Kyrgyzstan 173 202
15 Latvia 176 205
16 Lithuania 200 205
17 Moldova 174 350
18 Poland 500 975
19 Romania 255 600
20 Russia 506 601
21 Slovakia 170 220
22 Slovenia 188 223
23 Turkey 514 557
24 Ukraine 463 594
Table 2. Sample composition of 
micro data
 
MacroCI
MacroQI
InfraCI
InfraQI
InputCI
InputQI
InstitutionsCI
InstitutionsQI
Factor1
Factor2
Factor1
Factor2
Factor1
Factor2
Factor1
Factor2
VARIABLES
FACTOR
ANALYSIS AGGREGATION INDEX
(Factor1)     • (Factor2)W1 W2
(Factor1)     • (Factor2)W1 W2
(Factor1)     • (Factor2)W1 W2
(Factor1)     • (Factor2)W1 W2
Macro Index
Infrastructure
Index
Input Index
Institutions
Index
Factor1
Factor2
Factor3
F1W • F2W  • F3W
BCI
Business
Climate
Index
FACTOR
ANALYSIS AGGREGATION INDEX
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 The data used in the construction of the BCI comes from different sources. The macro 
data used in the estimation comes mainly from the World Bank3 while the micro data 
comes from a recently collected firm level survey conducted in East Europe and Central 
Asia by the EBRD in collaboration with the World Bank. This micro data set, BEEPS III, 
is based on a face-to-face survey of 8800 entrepreneurs in 24 countries (table 2).4  The 
strength of this micro data is that the same questions have been asked across countries 
and in two separate years, 2002 and 2005, hence enabling a meaningful international 
comparison of the business environment in Armenia with respect to its neighbors and 
competitors.  
 
1.3. Evolution of the Business Climate in Armenia 
 We start our analysis by looking at how the business environment in Armenia has 
changed over the last 3 years. We  
calculate the BCI for 2 periods, 
2002 and 2005 and examine 
the evolution of the BCI over 
this time period to see what 
factors have determined an 
improvement or deterioration 
of the investment climate in 
Armenia with respect to the 
other countries in East Europe 
and Central Asia. 
 
Before going ahead with this 
analysis, however, we wanted 
to test how good our indicator 
of BCI is. We first compare the 
level of BCI in 2002 with the average growth rate of GDP in the following 3 years.5 
Under the assumption that a better business climate is conducive to higher growth we 
expect a negative association between BCI index in 2002 and the growth rate of GDP in 
                                                 
3 The main source is the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the Doing Business project. One 
variable, corruption, is from Transparency International. Few data points were collected from the individual 
countries’ Central Bank web pages. 
4 The BEEPS III data include also Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Yugoslavia. In our calculations we had to 
exclude them because of missing macro data.  
5 Average GDP growth rate in 2002-2004. 
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Figure 3. Business Climate Index 
and GDP growth in ECA, 2002-2005
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the following 3-year period. Figure 3 shows a clear and significant association between 
BCI in 2002 and subsequent GDP growth rate in our 23 ECA countries.6 Because the 
BCI is build in such a way that a higher value represents a worse investment climate, the 
negative and significant association between BCI-2002 and growth rate of GDP gives us 
confidence that out BCI is a good indicator of the investment climate in the ECA region.  
 
Furthermore, to test the predictive power of the BCI at the micro level, we estimate the 
BCI in 2002 at the individual firm level only for Armenia7and compare it with the 
productivity level of the same firms in 2005.8 The assumption in this case is that firms 
that perceive a better IC in terms of quality and costs should be more productive, as 
measured by their level of total factor productivity (TFP).  Although the sample size is 
small, the data confirms that there is a significant relation between our BCI and firm 
productivity in Armenia. (figure 4) Firms that experienced a  
better business climate in 2002 are more 
productive in 2005.9 Given these results 
we gain a certain degree of confidence in 
the BCI and we start our analysis of the 
dynamics of the Business Climate in 
Armenia over the 2002-2005 period. 
 
Figure 5 reports the values of BCI in 2002 
on the x-axis and the values of BCI in 
2005 in the y-axis. The chart is divided 
into 4 quadrants by 2 lines corresponding 
to the average value of the BCI in each of 
the 2 years. For visual aid the axis are 
reversed, so that the top right quadrant of the chart indicates a better business climate.10 
The scatter plot reports the values for all 24 ECA countries in our sample.  
 
Countries falling in the first quadrant (upper right) are those that show a good business 
climate in both periods since they are above the average values in both years. Similarly 
                                                 
6 In this figure one country, Macedonia, was an outlier. The relation is significant at the 5% level. 
7 In this case the macro variables are excluded from the calculation of the BCI. Furthermore, in order to 
avoid loss of observations and to account for endogeneity a number of variables have been imputed by 
using the mean value of the whole sample. 
8 The BEEPS III has a small portion of the firms as panel.  
9 Similar results are obtained when the level of the BCI is compared to same year productivity. 
10 We need to recall that a lower value of BCI represents a better business climate. 
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Figure 4. Business Climate Index and Total Factor Producvity in 
Armenia, 2002-2005
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countries falling in the third quadrant have a bad business climate. Countries in the 
second quadrant show a deteriorating business climate, since in 2002 they were above the 
mean while in 2005 they fall below the mean. And finally the 4th quadrant identifies 
countries that have experienced an improvement in the business climate over the last 3 
years.  
 
We add a 45o degree line to 
this chart in order to identify 
the change in IC stance of 
each country over the 2002-
2005 period. Countries below 
the 45o line experience a 
deteriorating business climate 
while the opposite is true for 
countries above the line. 
 
From figure 5 we can see that 
Armenia falls into the 3rd 
quadrant. This implies that 
Armenia, notwithstanding its good performance in  
terms of GPD growth 
in the last 3 years, 
shows a bad business 
climate in both periods. 
Furthermore, since 
Armenia is situated 
below the 45o degree 
line, its business 
climate is 
deteriorating. We 
should note at this 
point that the analysis 
we are conducting is a 
relative analysis. In 
other words our index 
is constructed with 
Kyrgyzstan
Russia
Azerbaijan
Kazakhstan
ArmeniaGeorgia
Estonia
Lithuania
Latvia
Moldova
Bulgaria
Romania
Slovakia
Czech Rep.
Hungary
Belarus
Ukraine
Poland
SloveniaBiH
Turkey
Croatia
Albania
FYROM
Better 
Business 
ClimateBCI 2005
BCI 2002
Figure 5. Change in Business Climate 2002-2005
I
II
IV
Country BCI 2002 Rank 2002 Country BCI 2005 Rank 2005
FYROM 0.00 1 Turkey 0.00 1
Azerbaijan 1.79 2 Azerbaijan 2.24 2
Albania 2.19 3 Poland 2.43 3
Georgia 2.36 4 Albania 2.49 4
Poland 2.38 5 Estonia 2.86 5
Kyrgyzstan 2.45 6 Kyrgyzstan 2.87 6
Russia 2.71 7 Croatia 2.99 7
Kazakhstan 3.33 8 BiH 3.03 8
Armenia 3.33 9 Slovenia 3.09 9
Lithuania 3.36 10 Lithuania 3.10 10
Turkey 3.46 11 Slovakia 3.25 11
Slovenia 3.52 12 Latvia 3.27 12
Latvia 3.68 13 Hungary 3.40 13
Romania 3.71 14 Bulgaria 3.42 14
Estonia 3.72 15 Georgia 3.49 15
Belarus 3.74 16 Romania 3.63 16
BiH 3.76 17 FYROM 3.78 17
Bulgaria 3.78 18 Ukraine 3.83 18
Croatia 3.84 19 Moldova 3.85 19
Slovakia 3.85 20 Russia 3.93 20
Hungary 3.89 21 Kazakhstan 3.94 21
Ukraine 3.92 22 Belarus 3.98 22
Moldova 4.15 23 Czech Rep. 4.00 23
Czech Rep. 4.17 24 Armenia 4.14 24
Table 3. BCI index and ranking of ECA countries: 2002-2005
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respect to all the ECA countries in the sample, hence a worsening of the business climate 
means a deterioration with respect to all others countries in the sample. It is possible that 
in absolute terms Armenia has improved its business climate over time, but what our 
index tells us is that Armenia has improved less than the other countries in ECA.  
 
Table 3 reports the values of the BCI 
in both periods with the countries 
ranked accordingly in each period. 
From this table we can see that 
Armenia drops down to the last 
position in 2005 from a relatively 
good position in 2002. In our sample 
only one country (Macedonia, 
FYROM) has dropped as much over 
the last 3 years. Even Georgia 
experienced a less significant 
decline. Azerbaijan remains at the 
same level and Turkey actually 
records a 10 position gain. (Figure 6) 
 
Given the dramatic drop in ranking in Armenia we next analyze the individual 
components of the BCI in order to determine which factors represent the main source of 
such a plunge. 
Figure 7 shows each of 
the 4 components of 
the BCI for Armenia in 
the 2 periods. From this 
figure we can see that 
while macro stance has 
actually improved over 
time and the 
infrastructure index has 
remained virtually 
unchanged, the other 2 
components, 
institutions and inputs, 
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
Armenia
Georgia
Turkey
Azerbaijan
Figure 6. Change in rank 2002-2005
 
0
0.5
1
Macro index Infrastructure
index
Inputs index Institutions index
2002 2005
Figure 7. Components of BCI, 2002-2005
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have both deteriorated. Thus we focus our attention on these 2 categories. 
 
Figure 8 shows the relative 
position of Armenia with 
respect to the inputs 
market index in 2002 and 
2005.  
Now Armenia falls into 
the 2nd quadrant, 
indicating that the country 
is loosing competitiveness 
in terms of inputs markets 
within the ECA region. 
While in 2002 Armenia 
was above the mean, in 2005 Armenia fell below average. Note that Turkey and 
Azerbaijan both registered an improvement of their inputs markets during the same time 
period, while Georgia is in an even worse position than Armenia. An even worse picture 
comes out if we look at the evolution of the institution index. 
Figure 9 shows in fact 
that Armenia is not 
performing well in terms 
of its institutional 
environment in both 
periods, with a 
deteriorating trend. 
Armenia once again falls 
to the last rank in 2005 
from an already not 
encouraging position 
(20th) in 2002. Georgia 
and Azerbaijan also 
show a deteriorating institutional environment, while Turkey appears to be on a positive 
trend. 
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Figure 8. Inputs Market Index, 2002-2005
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Figure 9. Institutions Index, 2002-2005
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At this stage of the analysis 
we need to assess which 
dimension, cost and/or quality, 
of the 2 indices, inputs and 
institutions, has deteriorated 
most in Armenia.  
Figure 10 shows interestingly 
that while for the inputs 
markets the decline in the 
index is mainly attributable to 
quality considerations, both 
quality and costs indices for institutions have deteriorated in Armenia in the last 3 years.  
To be able to determine the underlying causes of such a change we need to identify, first, 
which principal component 
factors have changed most 
during this time period in 
Armenia, and, second, which 
variables are linked to these 
factors. We start with the input 
quality index. Four principal 
component factors make up this 
index. Figure 11 reports on the x-
axis the change in each factor 
over the 2002-2005 period, and on the y-axis the weight associated to each factor.11  
                                                 
11 As discussed earlier in the creation of the index each principal component has a different weight. 
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Figure 10. Institutions and Input indices in 
Armenia: 2002-2005
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From this figure it is clear that 
factor 1 is the only source of 
the overall deterioration of the 
inputs quality index, while 
factor 3 has improved over 
time, although with a much 
smaller weight.   
 
The underlying variables that 
most contributed to the 
change in the inputs quality 
index, that is the variables 
underlying factor 1 and, to a 
lesser extent, factor 3 are presented in figure 12.12  
 
This chart shows that over the 2002-2005 period while access to labor (skilled and 
managerial) has 
improved in Armenia, 
there has been a 
deterioration in the 
perception of access 
and cost of finance. At 
the same time, while the 
time necessary to 
process a loan request 
has improved, the 
availability of 
professional workers 
has deteriorated. In conclusion the major factors contributing to the deterioration of the 
quality index for the inputs markets have been the perception of access and cost of 
finance. 
                                                 
12 We recall that variables with a positive change indicate a negative contribution to the investment climate, 
while those with a negative change indicate a positive contribution. Furthermore variables that fall in the I 
and III quadrant have a positive impact on the value of the index, because of the interaction between the 
sign of the change and the sign of the loading factor of the principal component analysis. Furthermore in 
order to give a sense of the importance of each variable in the index aggregation, the size of the bullet in 
the figure corresponds to its weight in the aggregation. 
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Figure 12. Main variables underlying Factors 1 & 3 of 
the Input Quality Index
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More interesting is to assess the change in the position of Armenia with respect to its 
institutions. Institution in fact is the major component of the BCI that has deteriorated 
over the last 3 years. Fig 13 highlights the 7 principal factors that make up the institution 
quality index. Factor 1 and 2 appear to be the factors that mainly contribute to the  
deterioration of this 
quality index in Armenia. 
The underlying variables 
with their weights are 
presented in figure 14a.  
From this picture it 
appears very clearly that 
one variable is explaining 
most of the deterioration 
of the index: political 
influence. Over the past 3 
years there has been an enormous increase in the amount of political influence in 
Armenia. Apart from 
this main source, figure 
14b shows that also 
important are issues of 
corruption, crime, 
judicial inefficiency 
and red tape. Only 
regulatory uncertainty 
has improved.  
 
The issue of corruption 
is even more evident 
when we look at the 
cost dimension of 
institutions.  
Figure 15 identifies factor 1 as the single major driver of the deteriorating institutions in 
Armenia (from a cost perspective). Within factor 1 corruption, represented by percentage 
of contract value that needs to be paid in order to secure the  
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Figure 14a. Main variables underlying Factors 1 & 2 of 
the Institutions Quality Index
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contract and bribes in general to get 
things done, is the major factor 
contributing to the deterioration of the 
index. (Figure 16) 
 
In conclusion, our analysis of the 
investment climate in Armenia has 
shown that, over the 2002-2005 period, 
Armenia has 
experienced a 
deterioration of 
its business 
climate. The 
major reason of 
such a 
phenomenon is 
the decline of  
its institutions. 
Both the quality 
(perceptions) of 
Armenian’s 
institutions and the costs associated with its institutional environment have worsen. In 
particular, political influence, corruption, red tape and inefficiency of judicial system are 
the main culprits. The negative perception on access and cost of finance also remain a 
further weakening feature of Armenia’s IC in 2005. 
 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
-0.2 -0.1 0 0.1 0.2 0.3
Figure 15. Principal component factors in the 
Institutions Cost Index
Change 2002-2005
w
e
ig
h
t
1
2
3 4
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
cgovconcbride
cpropay
cexlab
% change in variable over the 2002-2005 period
lo
ad
Figure 16. Main variables underlying Factors 1 & 2 of the Institutions 
Cost Index
 
 17
Section 2. Major Business Obstacles in Armenia in 2005 
 
2.1 Main Investment Climate impediments perceived by Armenians’ entrepreneurs 
The BEEPS 2005 survey in Armenia asks managers to rate a list of constraints to the 
operations and growth of their businesses.  We start the analysis of the Business 
constraints in Armenia by looking at these perceptions. Figure 2.1 ranks 18 potential 
bottlenecks as perceived by our sample of firms in Armenia. If we look only at the 
constraints that at least half of the managers considered binding, 3 areas of policy 
intervention stand out: (i) Tax (rates and administration); (ii) Macroeconomic instability; 
and (iii) Finance (more cost than access). 
 
0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0
Crime, theft,disorder
Electricity
Labor regulations
Skills of avail. workers
Telecommunications
Transport
Legal system/conflict res.
Access to land
Licensing and operating permits
Economic & regulatory policy uncertainty
Corruption
Customs and trade regulations
Anti-competitive/informal practices
Access to finance
Cost of finance
Tax rates
Macroeconomic instability
Tax adm
Source: BEEPS 2005
Figure 2.1 Armenia's Percpetion of Investment Climate Constraints
 Percentage of firms rating each contraint a major obstacle 
 
Figure 2.2 shows how Armenia compares to neighboring countries with respect to these 
three constraints.  From the chart it is clear that a greater percentage of firms in Armenia 
view finance and macro instability as a problem than in the other countries, while the 
perceptions on taxes seem quite similar. 
 
In the rest of this section we focus on two of these top constraints: Tax and Finance. Our 
analysis is based mainly on the results of the BEEPS 2005 surveys, although additional 
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sources are also used, such as the World Bank Doing Business indicators and 
Transparency International. 
 
2.2 Tax rates and tax 
administration 
Tax administration and 
tax rates are among the 
top constraints to 
Armenian businesses as 
reported by the BEEPS 
2005 survey.  The 
perception of taxes as 
constraints is not equally 
distributed among firms 
in Armenia. Domestic, 
non exporters and small firms perceive such issues more as a constraint. The difference in 
perceptions between exporters 
and non exporter and domestic 
and foreign is due to the fact 
that Armenia currently offers  
incentives for exporters (no 
export duty, VAT refund on 
goods and services exported) 
and foreign investors (income  
tax holidays, and the ability to 
indefinitely carry forward 
losses).13 Also, in accordance 
with the Law on Foreign Investment, several ad hoc incentives may be negotiated on a 
case-by-case basis for investments targeted at certain sectors of the economy and/or of 
strategic importance to the economy. 
 
Although many would think that no matter how low tax rates are managers will always 
complain, results from the Doing Business indicators seem to confirm this negative 
                                                 
13 There are eight kinds of taxes which private corporations operating in Armenia may be subject to under 
the Armenian tax system: a. Profit Tax ("corporate income tax"), b. Income Tax ("personal income tax"), c. 
Value-Added Tax (hereafter VAT), d. Custom Duties and Excise, e. Property Tax, f. Land Tax, g. 
Simplified Tax, h. Presumptive Tax (Fixed Tax).  
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perception in Armenia. The tax rate on gross profit is in fact higher in Armenia when 
compared to its neighbors (figure 2.3).  Furthermore, a White Paper on the Armenian Tax 
System from the American and European Union Chambers of Commerce in Armenia 
while conceding that Armenia’s rates are higher than in many other countries, it points 
out that the overwhelming problem with the Armenian tax system is difficulty of  
compliance and 
unpredictability. Data from 
the Doing Business 
substantiate this allegation 
by showing that it takes 
almost 10 times longer and 
requires almost 3 times 
more payments to comply 
with tax provisions in 
Armenia than in Turkey. 
(figure 2.4). Furthermore, 
according to the BEEPS 2005 survey over half of the firms interviewed consider the 
interpretations of laws and regulations affecting their activity inconsistent and 
unpredictable. 
 
Tax administration seems therefore to be a problem in Armenia, not only for its 
unpredictability but also for its inefficiency. As a matter of fact despite an acceleration of 
real GDP growth in recent years the amount of taxes over GDP collected in Armenia has 
declined from 18.8% in the first half of 2005 to just 15.9% toward the end of the year. 
Tax collection has been  
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week in Armenia for 
quite some time, 
avaraging 14.3% of 
GDP over the period 
2000-2004, well 
below the rate of 
countries in the 
region and at similar 
level of development. 
(figure 2.5)14 The 
weak tax/GDP ratio has in the past been partly attributed to the fact that many of the most 
dynamic sectors of the economy were not subject to taxation. However, in 2005 the 
volume of non-taxed activities has declined. The fact that the increase in the tax/GDP 
ratio has not kept pace with real GDP growth suggests that tax evasion among Armenia’s 
businesses is still high (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2005b). 
2.3 – Tax Administration, Inspections and Corruption: a Further Look 
In this part of the paper we go one step further in the analysis of the link between tax 
administration and tax evasion. Fist we attempt to corroborate the existence of a relation 
between perception on tax system and other perceptions. We achieve this through the 
following Probit model:15  
 
),,,( XsInspectionyInformalPaGifttaxTAX Φ=  [2.1] 
 
We fit the model for tax rate and tax administration separately (TAX).16 Explanatory 
variables include: the “Payment of gift for taxes purposes” (Gifttax); the “Payment of 
informal gifts to get things done (with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, 
services etc)” (InformalPay); and the number of inspections for tax purposes 
(Inspections). A set of controls variables, X, is also included, such as number of 
employees, export status and ownership.   
 
Results show a strong and significant association between corruption and both 
perceptions. The more managers perceive corruption as a problem the more likely they 
                                                 
14 CIS includes Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Russia, Tajikistan, Ukraine, 
and Uzbekistan 
15 We estimate the probit model for two levels of perception: tax as minor/no vs. tax as major problem. 
16 We obtain similar results if we estimate the model for both perceptions jointly. 
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CountriesSource:Davoodi and Grigorian (2005)
Figure 2.5 Tax revenues (as % GDP)
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consider also tax rates and tax administration as a constraint. On average, firms that pay 
gift for taxes purposes are 40% more likely to consider tax rate as a problem and almost 
60% more likely to consider tax administration as a bottleneck. Similarly managers that 
admit to pay bribes to get things done are 20% more likely to consider tax (both rates and 
administrations) as a problem. Results are robust even if a number of controls (size, 
export status, and ownership) are included.17  
 
A peculiar result here is related to the number of inspections for tax purposes and the 
presence of informal payments. We found that in Armenia a greater number of 
inspections increase the probability of informal payments by 15%, while in Georgia, and 
Turkey there is no evidence of such a relationship, while in Azerbaijan this relationship 
was reversed.18 (Table 2.1).  
Table 2.1. Impact of Red Tape on Corruption  
(robust t-statistics in parenthesis) 
 Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia Turkey 
Number of inspections 0.438 -0.625 0.014 0.112 
 (2.97)** (2.55)* (0.05) (0.59) 
Constant -0.218 0.297 -0.809 -1.031 
 (1.86) (2.55)* (3.75)** (7.36)** 
Observations 317 155 118 253 
Pseudo R2 0.0202 0.0311 0.0000   0.0073 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
These results made us think of the existence of some unobserved link between tax 
administrations (and hence inspections), corruption, and tax rates (and hence tax 
evasion). We attempted to investigate the existence of such a link starting with a simple 
linear model between tax evasion and number of inspections:  
 
esInspectionEvasion ii ++= 10 ββ                   [2.2] 
 
We would expect that as the number of inspections increase the amount of tax evasion 
would decrease. Surprisingly in Armenia we find no statistically significant relation 
between number of inspections and the amount of taxes paid. Results are robust even if a 
number of controls (size, export orientation, and ownership) are included. (Table 2.2) 
 
                                                 
17 Results are even stronger if we include only bribes to tax officials. See tables Annex 2.1-2.4 in Appendix. 
18 A complete set of results are presented in Annex 2.5-2.7 in the Appendix. 
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Table 2.2. Impact of Red Tape on Tax Evasion 
(robust t-statistics in parenthesis) 
Investment Climate variable Tax evasion Tax evasion Tax evasion Tax evasion Tax evasion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Number of inspections 0.044 0.040 0.057 0.044 0.047 
 (0.24) (0.21) (0.31) (0.24) (0.25) 
Medium (dummy)  1.580   1.621 
  (1.32)   (1.33) 
Large (dummy)  -1.512   -1.361 
  (1.02)   (0.76) 
Exporter (dummy)   -1.497  -0.919 
   (1.15)  (0.61) 
Foreign ownership (dummy)    -0.245 1.044 
    (0.14) (0.54) 
State ownership (dummy)    -0.187 0.393 
    (0.08) (0.16) 
Constant 4.437 4.045 4.720 4.472 4.046 
 (6.03)** (4.05)** (6.09)** (5.80)** (4.02)** 
Observations 344 344 344 344 344 
R-squared 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
This unexpected result led us believe the presence of an unobserved variable in this 
relationship: corruption. This belief was fuelled by our earlier results showing that 
managers that face corruption as a problem more likely view also tax administration as a 
bottleneck, as well as by the significant association between inspections and ‘gifts’.  This 
led us to believe that the marginal effect of inspections on tax evasion 
( 1/ β=∂∂ InspectionEvasion ) is a function of corruption (gift paid to tax officials). 
Hence, following Klein and Morgan (1951), we assumed: 
 
uGifttax +∗+= 101 ααβ          [2.3] 
 
Substituting [2.3] into [2.2] and simplifying we obtain: 
 
εααβ +∗++= sInspectionGifttaxsInspectionEvasioni *100          [2.4] 
 
where the new error term sInspectionue ∗+=ε  is by construction heteroskedastic, 
hence we estimated the model [2.4] with robust error.19 The results show that the 
coefficient on the interaction term, 1α , is significant and positive. We interpret this as 
                                                 
19 White correction for heteroskedasticity. 
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evidence that the payment of unofficial gifts at the time of inspections has a significant 
negative impact on reported tax. At the same time, after controlling for corruption, the 
coefficient on inspections becomes significantly positive and of the expected sign. 
Results remain robust even if a number of controls (size, export orientation, and 
ownership) are included. (table 2.3). We conclude that the problem of tax evasion in 
Armenia is not in the inefficiency of the inspections, but rather on the pervasive impact of 
corruption. 
Table 2.3. Impact of Corruption on Tax Evasion 
(robust t-statistics in parenthesis) 
Investment Climate variable Tax evasion Tax evasion Tax evasion Tax evasion Tax evasion 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Number of inspections -0.754 -0.720 -0.732 -0.766 -0.726 
 (2.60)** (2.47)* (2.52)* (2.62)** (2.47)* 
Number of inspections*Gift Tax 0.403 0.385 0.396 0.408 0.388 
 (3.38)** (3.13)** (3.34)** (3.40)** (3.12)** 
Medium (dummy)  1.713   1.772 
  (1.31)   (1.38) 
Large (dummy)  -0.988   -0.638 
  (0.87)   (0.36) 
Exporter (dummy)   -1.278  -0.761 
   (0.89)  (0.40) 
Foreign ownership (dummy)    -0.870 -0.001 
    (0.54) (0.00) 
State ownership (dummy)    0.717 1.015 
    (0.30) (0.42) 
Constant 4.054 3.530 4.322 4.103 3.534 
 (4.65)** (3.99)** (5.06)** (4.41)** (3.98)** 
Observations 314 314 314 314 314 
R-squared 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Corruption remains a major problem in Armenia even though the overall assessment of 
the perception questions shown in figure 2.1 seems to indicate that corruption is the 8th 
problem. This is confirmed not only by the above analysis and by the earlier discussion 
on the evolution of investment climate presented in the first section of this paper, but also 
by the fact that BEEPS 2005 shows that informal payments for taxes seem to occur 
frequently. When asked “How often firms make payments/gifts for taxes and tax 
collections,” more than 50% of firms admitted such a practice. Furthermore, 
Transparency International reported 79% of businesses considering corruption as 
problematic in Armenia. 
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To the credit of the Armenian authorities we should mention that there has been some 
recent progress in the fight against corruption. This reflects a number of reforms 
introduced during the last three years, including the simplification of licensing 
procedures, the introduction of a new criminal code, privatization in the energy sector, 
and dissemination of laws and regulations. Moreover, since 2002 a reform of the civil 
service has been under way and an anti-corruption council is in charge of overseeing the 
government’s strategy in this area. Despite these improvements, however, corruption 
remains a major problem as shown by the BCI index and the recent evidence from 
BEEPS 2005. 
 
2.4 Cost and Access to Finance 
Over half of Armenia’s enterprises reported both access and cost of finance as an obstacle 
for the operation and growth of their business.20   This negative attitude seems particularly 
relevant for smaller enterprises, and for non exporters than for exporters. 
 
In order to better understand 
what drives the negative 
perceptions on finance, we first 
look at cost of finance. The fact 
that cost of finance is perceived 
as a bottleneck is surprising 
because over the last few years 
we have observed a gradual 
downward trend in the average 
real lending rate in Armenia. 
Thanks to an improved macro 
environment, interest rates have decreased to approximately 15% in 2004 from as much 
as 33% in 2000 (Figure 2.6).  Therefore, given that Armenian firms enjoy a lower interest 
rate than in neighboring countries (figure 2.7) and that only a quarter of the firms without 
a loan cite high interest rates as a reason, this complaint does not find justification in our 
data.  
 
As for access to finance we first consider what sources of finance Armenian firms use  
                                                 
20 One point that should not go unmentioned is the statistically significant relationship between 
these two constraints. The chi-squared test of independence between the two ordinal variables 
shows a test statistic of 361.35 with a p-value of .000, thus we reject the null hypothesis that the 
two variables are independent. 
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Figure 2.6 Real interest rate in Armenia
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(i.e. short term credit, such as overdrafts 
versus longer term credit, such as 
loans).  Figure 2.8 shows that the great 
majority of firms in our sample has no 
access to the banking system. Over 60% 
of firms in Armenia does not use banks 
for short term financing and an even 
higher share, 65%, cannot rely on long 
term financing from the banking 
system.   
 
                             Figure 2.8. Share of firms with access to bank financing 
without 
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Source: BEEPS 2005
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Another factor that has an impact on access to finance, and to some extent to cost of 
finance, is the amount of required collateral. In our sample the required collateral  
averaged 180% of the loan 
value, much higher than 
the value in neighboring 
countries where the 
percentage of collateral 
required is as low as 45% 
of Armenia’s level.  
(figure 2.9) Being able to 
provide a guarantee worth 
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it almost twice the value of the loan represents a real obstacle to obtaining finance.21 The 
fact that access to finance is a problem in Armenia is confirmed also by the World Bank 
Doing Business indicators. In this survey in fact Armenia ranks below the regional 
average and most of the neighboring countries on the credit accessibility index,22 
designed to measures the  
degree to which 
collateral and 
bankruptcy laws 
facilitate lending. (figure 
2.10) Lack of finance to 
business in Armenia is a 
problem evident even at 
the aggregate level, as 
highlighted by a recent 
paper by Holden and 
Sahakyan (2005). Figure 2.11 shows how the level of financial development in Armenia, 
measured by the share of credit provided by the banking sector, is very low not only from 
a regional perspective but also when compared to countries at the same level of 
development. In conclusion, access to finance seems more of a problem for Armenian 
firms than cost even though the result of perception questions seems to indicate 
otherwise.   
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21 The principal source of collateral in the BEEPS sample is represented by buildings. 
22 “Legal Rights Index” in the Doing Business Data  
Figure 2.10 Legal Rights index
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Section 3. Investment Climate Impact on Firm performance and Policy Implications  
 
3.1 Productivity impact of major business obstacles 
We have so far established that bureaucratic burden, corruption, and finance are the top 
binding constraints affecting Armenian firms’ growth and operations. In this final section 
of the analysis we attempt to quantify the impact of each of these three investment 
climate factors on productivity and competitiveness. 
 
Productivity is estimated by fitting the following Escribano-augmented23 Cobb-Douglass 
production function: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) in
n
nnieikili DEscrKLVA εβββββ +++++= ∑−
=
1
1
0 lnlnln  [3.1] 
 
where iVA  is the value added (in log) for firm i; iL  is the total cost of labor (in log); iK  
is the capital stock, proxied by the estimated total replacement value of machinery, 
equipment, land, and buildings (in log); iEscr  is a vector of firm-level control variables 
and includes a dummy variable for the age of the firm (0 if less than 5 years old;1 
otherwise), a dummy variable for accounts externally audited; and a dummy variable for 
competition in the domestic market; nD  is a set of industry dummies for each of the 19 
industries sampled. 
 
                                                 
23 We follow the methodology suggested by Escribano and Guasch (2004). For robustness check we fit two 
different formulations of the same production function, one with total manpower cost and the other with 
total number of workers as proxies for labor. We also estimate the traditional OLS Cobb-Douglass 
production function. The estimates of the production function are reported in the appendix, annex 3.1. 
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Total Factor Productivity (TFP) is constructed as the estimate of iε , the part of value 
added not explained by the cost of labor and capital, after controlling for industries fixed 
effects and addressing endogeneity concerns through the Escribano methodology.. 
 
The impact on our proxy of firm’s performance (TFP) of each of the investment climate 
variables identified in our earlier analysis is estimated through the following equation 
using ordinary least squares with robust standard errors: 
 
iiii FCICTFP ηααα +++= 210  [3.2] 
 
where iTFP  is the total factor productivity (in log) for firm i; iIC  is the vector of the 
investment climate variables (i.e. bureaucratic burden, corruption, and finance); iFC  is a 
vector of firm-level control variables such as size, export orientation and ownership 
status.  
 
The equations are estimated first separately for each measure of investment climate and 
then jointly. While multiple variables can be used for each of the 3 areas of interest, the 
estimation does not include all the investment climate measures simultaneously for two 
reasons. First, to minimize the loss of observations. Not all firms provided answers to all 
questions. Therefore the more variables included at one time, the smaller the available 
sample. Secondly, investment climate variables addressing the same issue tend to be 
highly correlated, causing collinearity problems. 
 
The results of estimating equation [3.2] are shown below. Each investment climate 
measure is estimated separately with and without controls for firm characteristics. 
 
RED TAPE 
Governance, defined here as number of inspections with public officials, has a direct 
impact on firms through the regulatory and administrative procedures affecting day-to-
day operations. An excessive bureaucracy increases the cost of doing business and 
dampens firms’ performance. 
 
To explore the effect of government visits on firms’ productivity in Armenia, we 
regressed our measure of performance (TFP) against the total number of days spent by 
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entrepreneurs in inspections and required meeting with public officials in the last 12 
months24 The results are shown in table 3.1.   
 
Table 3.1. Impact of Red Tape on Firm Productivity in Armenia 
(robust t-statistics in parenthesis) 
Investment Climate Variable 
TFP Escribano 
(manpower 
costs) 
TFP Escribano 
(total workers) 
TFP 
OLS 
TFP Escribano 
(manpower 
costs) 
TFP Escribano 
(total workers) 
TFP 
OLS 
Inspections/Meetings with public 
officials (log) -0.154 -0.103 -0.108 -0.149 -0.125 -0.119 
 (4.54)*** (4.77)*** (2.75)** (3.61)*** (6.44)*** (2.56)** 
Medium (dummy)    0.063 0.033 -0.006 
    (1.31) (0.40) (0.12) 
Large (dummy)    -0.110 -0.184 -0.159 
    (0.063) (0.033) (0.006) 
Exporter (dummy)    0.316 0.259 0.341 
    (3.67)*** (5.55)*** (3.62)*** 
Foreign Ownership (dummy)    -0.000 -0.028 -0.026 
    (0.00) (0.39) (0.23) 
State Ownership (dummy)    0.342 0.384 0.318 
    (1.60) (2.82)** (1.30) 
Observations 204 201 206 202 202 206 
R-squared 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.13 0.10 0.10 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Inspections show a significant and negative association with firm productivity. The 
BEEPS 2005 data shows that a 1% increase in the number of inspections by public 
officials is associated with an approximately 10% decrease in total factor productivity, 
even when controlling for a number of firm specific characteristics. A business 
environment characterized by less bureaucracy in Armenia is beneficial to firms and 
helps improve their productivity.  
 
CORRUPTION 
A large regulatory burden is often associated with high levels of corruption, involving 
payments to inspectors who visit the firm or to public officials granting permits. 
Taking into account that gathering reliable information on corruption is difficult because 
of the sensitive nature of such data, we tried to assess the impact of corruption on firm 
                                                 
24 The BEEPS 2005 question refers to meetings with Tax Inspectorate, Labor and Social Security, Fire and 
Building Safety, Sanitation/Epidemiology, Municipal Police, Environmental and Protection Agency, 
Custom Agency. 
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level productivity in Armenia by using the average amount of unofficial payments made 
to public officials to “speed up” bureaucratic procedures25 as proxy for corruption.  
 
The analysis shows a significant and positive correlation between the average amount of 
informal payments made to public officials to get things done and total factor 
productivity (table 3.2). 
 
Table 3.2. Impact of Corruption on Firm Productivity in Armenia 
(robust t-statistics in parenthesis) 
Investment Climate Variable 
TFP Escribano 
(manpower 
costs) 
TFP Escribano 
(total workers) 
TFP 
OLS 
TFP Escribano 
(manpower 
costs) 
TFP Escribano 
(total workers) 
TFP 
OLS 
Informal payments to public 
officials to get things done  0.026 0.020 0.033 0.035 0.024 0.044 
 (4.45)*** (3.85)*** (5.12)*** (6.13)*** (4.85)*** (7.00)*** 
Medium (dummy) 
 
   
0.007 0.001 -0.029 
    (0.10) (0.01) (0.38) 
Large  (dummy)    -0.096 -0.174 -0.115 
    (0.81) (1.14) (0.84) 
Exporter (dummy)    0.266 0.198 0.300 
    (3.74)*** (7.78)*** (3.66)*** 
Foreign Ownership (dummy)    0.039 0.003 0.028 
    (0.40) (0.05) (0.26) 
State Ownership (dummy)    0.501 0.512 0.455 
    (2.86)** (4.24)*** (2.27)** 
Observations 205 202 206 203 200 206 
R-squared 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.09 0.07 0.10 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
How can we interpret this result? Our interpretation is that firms that make “informal 
payments” gain a competitive advantage with respect to those that do not. A greater 
regulatory burden implies more onerous procedures to fully comply with laws and 
regulations. In this scenario, firms that manage to “ease” bureaucratic hassles better than 
others by making “gifts” to public officials outperform, on average by 2-3%, those that 
do not. The positive sign of the coefficient, however, should not lead to the conclusion 
that firms that pay bribes are more productive than those who do not make informal 
payments. Our data asserts the existence of a positive relationship between our proxy for 
corruption and performance. It does not imply that bribes guarantee higher productivity. 
In fact, bribes could be positively correlated with better firm performance if bribe-seekers 
                                                 
25 In percent of total annual sales. 
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are attracted to firms that are more productive, as these firms may be more willing and 
able to provide bribes. It is our interpretation that firms that pay bribes gain an unfair 
competitive advantage, in the order of 2-3% higher TFP, by reducing their bureaucratic 
burden and by avoiding unwanted competition. 
 
 
FINANCE 
 
Finance is yet another constraint identified by entrepreneurs in Armenia as binding. 
Although both access and cost of finance are among the top bottlenecks, we have seen 
that access to long term financing seems more of a bottleneck. As a matter of fact, only 
45 percent of the firms surveyed reported to have had recently a loan from a bank.  
 
Do firms with a bank loan are more productive than those that did not or could not 
borrow money from the banking system? Our analysis (table 3.3a) seems to suggest that 
they do. By regressing a dummy for having a bank loan against our measure of 
productivity, we find that firms with a bank loan are on average 10% more productive 
than those that can only rely on internal sources of capital to finance their business. 
 
 
Table 3.3a. Impact of Access to Finance on Firm Productivity in Armenia 
(robust t-statistics in parenthesis) 
Investment Climate Variable 
TFP Escribano 
(manpower costs) 
TFP 
Escribano 
(total 
workers) 
TFP 
OLS 
TFP Escribano 
(manpower 
costs) 
TFP Escribano 
(total workers) 
TFP 
OLS 
Bank loan (dummy) 0.112 0.114 0.136 0.057 0.090 0.096 
 (2.78)** (1.98)* (2.47)** (0.88) (2.32)** (1.87)* 
Medium  (dummy)    0.004 -0.063 -0.015 
    (0.11) (0.91) (0.32) 
Large  (dummy)    -0.058 -0.235 -0.116 
    (0.44) (1.44) (0.77) 
Exporter (dummy)    0.229 0.196 0.294 
    (2.37)** (4.35)*** (2.72)** 
Foreign Ownership (dummy)    -0.015 -0.010 -0.045 
    (0.16) (0.19) (0.45) 
Observations 197 194 200 196 195 199 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.05 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Furthermore, as a robustness check and to capture more broadly the extent to which the 
firm has access to formal finance, we also constructed a composite index of finance based 
on the share of a firm’s short-term and long-term financing from the banking system, plus 
the share of trade credit, both short and long term.26  A higher value of the index 
corresponds to a higher degree of access to formal finance. Our regressions show that the 
index is positively and significantly correlated with total factor productivity, confirming 
the earlier results that firms with better access to credit are more productive than firms 
relying more on internal sources of financing, even controlling for firms’ characteristics. 
(Table 3.3b) 
                                                 
26 We used principal component analysis to create this index. 
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Table 3.3b. Impact of Access to Finance on Firm Productivity in Armenia 
(robust t-statistics in parenthesis) 
Investment Climate Variable 
TFP Escribano 
(manpower 
costs) 
TFP Escribano 
(total workers) 
TFP 
OLS 
TFP Escribano 
(manpower 
costs) 
TFP Escribano 
(total workers) 
TFP 
OLS 
Finance Index 0.072 0.049 0.102 0.056 0.044 0.079 
 (3.09)*** (1.78)* (4.70)*** (1.91)* (1.83)* (2.95)*** 
Medium (dummy)    0.008 -0.041 0.009 
    (0.14) (0.78) (0.11) 
Large (dummy)    -0.006 -0.193 -0.023 
    (0.04) (0.97) (0.12) 
Exporter (dummy)    0.254 0.287 0.338 
    (3.69)*** (4.22)*** (5.99)*** 
Foreign Ownership (dummy)    -0.149 -0.125 -0.194 
    (1.36) (1.60) (1.79)* 
State Ownership (dummy)    0.478 0.556 0.469 
    (2.21)** (3.37)*** (1.87)* 
Observations 199 200 201 199 200 201 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.05 0.08 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
While access to finance is an issue in Armenia, as also highlighted in the previous 
section, borrowing 
from the banking 
system is even more 
difficult for small 
firms than it is for 
medium and large 
businesses. Our index 
of finance in fact 
shows that firms with 
less than 10 
employees have a 
much lower access to formal finance than medium and large firms. (figure 3.1) 
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Figure 3.1 Access to formal finance in Armenia, by firm size 
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3.2 Policy reform prioritization for productivity and competitiveness  
So far we have seen that red tape, corruption and lack of credit have a negative impact on 
Armenian firms’ productivity. In this last part of the paper we attempt to answer two final 
questions: should policy intervention prioritize one constraint over the others? And, will 
an enhanced business climate also generate a resurgence of Armenian competitiveness? 
 
To determine the priority of reforms we first estimate the productivity impact of all three 
IC variables jointly. Then we estimate the average contribution of each of the three 
variables to Armenia’s TFP. This will allow us to identify which of the 3 areas of 
intervention will have the highest impact on firm performance in Armenia and hence 
provide an order of importance for policy reform. The results of the joint analysis are 
presented in table 3.4. It is interesting to note that all 3 coefficients remain significant at 
the 1% or 5% level and have the expected sign.  
 
 
 
Table 3.4. Impact of all 3 IC constraints on Firm Productivity in Armenia 
(robust t-statistics in parenthesis) 
Investment Climate Variable 
TFP Escribano 
(manpower 
costs) 
TFP Escribano 
(total workers) 
TFP 
OLS 
TFP Escribano 
(manpower 
costs) 
TFP Escribano 
(total workers) 
TFP 
OLS 
Inspections/Meetings with 
public officials (log) -0.151 -0.106 -0.109 -0.165 -0.114 -0.127 
 (4.74)*** (5.57)*** (3.00)*** (4.35)*** (8.09)*** (2.97)*** 
Informal payments to public 
officials to get things done 0.024 0.017 0.030 0.036 0.024 0.041 
 
(3.51)*** (2.52)** (3.55)*** (5.48)*** (3.42)*** (5.36)*** 
Bank loan (dummy) 0.119 0.101 0.118 0.080 0.099 0.095 
 
(2.70)** (1.67) (1.94)* (2.21)** (2.87)** (1.78)* 
Medium (dummy)    0.027 -0.014 -0.014 
    (0.59) (0.17) (0.22) 
Large (dummy)    -0.099 -0.190 -0.057 
    (0.85) (1.17) (0.34) 
Exporter (dummy)    0.320 0.232 0.299 
    (3.67)*** (4.31)*** (3.13)*** 
Foreign Ownership (dummy)    0.022 -0.010 -0.022 
    (0.26) (0.14) (0.21) 
State Ownership (dummy)    0.413 0.472 0.393 
    (1.91)* (3.58)*** (1.65) 
Observations 204 201 205 202 201 205 
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R-squared 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.18 0.12 0.15 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the results of the 
TFP decomposition. It is clear that 
red tape exerts the  
highest contribution to 
productivity in Armenia, both in 
terms of marginal impact and as 
share of total TFP, followed by 
access to finance and corruption. 
Far from implying that red tape is 
the only policy reform Armenia 
should adopt, our analysis has shown that all 3 areas of intervention should be put at the 
forefront of the policy debate in the country, with bureaucratic burden being the first. 
 
So far we have seen clear evidence that reforms on red tape, access to finance, and 
corruption will improve the Armenian productivity. But will they also foster Armenia’s 
competitiveness? In order to address this question we need to look at how Armenia 
performs in terms of productivity from an international perspective, and then we need to 
assess the impact of these policy reforms on its competitiveness.  
 
Figure 3.3 reports Armenia’s productivity gap compared to a number of countries in the 
region.27 Armenia appears as productive as Georgia and 40% less productive than 
Turkey. At the same time Armenia is more productive than the Central Asian countries in 
the sample and about 60% more productive than Moldova. Finally Armenia, not 
surprisingly, is less productive than the EU members in the Baltic, although the 
productivity gap with Lithuania is smaller than the gap with Turkey. 
 
                                                 
27 The productivity gap is estimated by pooling individual country data sets and fitting equation [3.1] with 
country dummies. The results are presented in the appendix, annex 3.2. 
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Figure 3.3. Armenia's Productivity Gap with Selected Countries in the Region: 2005
 
Will the policy interventions highlighted earlier bridge the 40% productivity gap between 
Armenia and Turkey? To answer this question we fit the following model: 
 
εγγγγ +∗∗+∗+∗+= CountryDICCountryDICTFP iiii 3210           [3.3] 
 
We estimated this model on a pooled data set with Turkey as omitted category. The 
significance of the coefficient on the interaction term ( ICArmeniaD ∗ ) will determine if 
the change in the IC variable has an incremental impact on Armenia over the base 
country (Turkey).  
 
The results are presented in table 3.5. The first 3 columns report the productivity impact 
of the 3 IC variables, red tape, finance (loans), and corruption. None of the interaction 
terms are significant leading to the conclusion that none of the three policy interventions 
will help reduce Armenia’s productivity gap with Turkey.  
 
Earlier we saw that the results of the impact on access to finance on productivity were 
even stronger when we used the index rather than the dummy for loans. Again we 
suspected that our proxy for finance (loan dummy) was not the best indicator for access 
to finance. Therefore we decided to re-estimate model [3.3] but this time using as proxy 
for access to finance the actual components of the previous index, that is the share of 
financing from the banking system and from trade credit. 
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Table 3.5. Impact of IC variables on Armenia’s Competitiveness compared to Turkey 
(robust t-statistics in parenthesis) 
 TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP TFP 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
        
Armenia (dummy) -0.698 -0.795 -0.622 -0.653 -0.822 -0.590 -0.523 
 (1.70)* (1.09) (2.29)** (2.49)** (3.37)*** (2.53)** (2.31)** 
Red tape -0.005       
 (0.06)       
Armenia*Red tape 0.030       
 (0.40)       
Loan  -0.760      
  (1.05)      
Armenia*loan  0.394      
  (0.51)      
Corruption   -0.097     
   (0.94)     
Armenia*Corrupt   0.047     
   (0.44)     
Banks short term (Bks)    0.010    
    (1.68)*    
Armenia*Bks    -0.000    
    (0.04)    
Banks long term (Bkl)     -0.008   
     (1.67)*   
Armenia *Bkl     0.017   
     (2.89)***   
Trade credit (short)      0.001  
      (0.19)  
Armenia*Tcs      0.053  
      (1.85)*  
Trade credit (long)       0.017 
       (2.12)** 
Armenia *Tcl       0.044 
       (4.65)*** 
Constant 3.496 4.289 3.717 3.450 3.646 3.598 3.549 
 (9.20)*** (6.21)*** (15.17)*** (15.08) *** (17.40)*** (17.15)*** (17.60)*** 
Observations 250 160 282 282 282 282 282 
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.04 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
The results are shown on columns (4)-(7) of table 3.5. From this set of results it is clear 
that better access to finance will in fact improve Armenia’s competitiveness compared to 
Turkey. However not all forms of financing will have this impact. Short-term loans from 
banks will not, while long term financing from the banking system will help bridge the 
gap in productivity with Turkey. Furthermore, trade finance, both short term and long 
term will have an even greater impact. Increasing the share of long term financing from 
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bank loans by 40% on average, or increasing access to trade credit by approximately 10% 
of total financing will help bridge Armenia’s productivity gap with Turkey. 
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Appendix 
 
Annex 2.1. Probit results of Corruption on Tax Rate perception  
(robust t-statistics in parenthesis) 
Investment Climate variable Tax Rate Tax Rate Tax Rate Tax Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gift for tax (dummy) 0.168 0.443 0.424 0.444 
 (2.43)* (2.33)* (2.23)* (2.33)* 
Gift to get things done (dummy) 0.089 0.23 0.234 0.271 
 (2.67)** (2.55)* (2.58)** (1.64) 
Number of inspections 0.112 0.273 0.341 0.225 
 (1.83) (1.67) (2.09)* (2.46)* 
Medium (dummy)  0.141   
  (0.79)   
Large (dummy)  -0.127   
  (0.6)   
Exporter (dummy)   -0.498  
   (2.69)**  
Foreign Ownership (dummy)    -0.497 
    (2.07)* 
State Ownership (dummy)    -0.409 
    (1.31) 
Constant -0.604 -0.596 0.49 -0.463 
 (3.08)** (2.72)** (2.42)* (2.20)* 
Observations 303 303 303 303 
Pseudo R2 0.0982 0.1028 0.1164 0.1120 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Annex 2.2. Probit results of Corruption on Tax Administration perception  
(robust t-statistics in parenthesis) 
Investment Climate variable 
Tax 
Administration 
Tax 
Administration 
Tax 
Administration 
Tax 
Administration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gift for tax (dummy) 0.588 0.546 0.556 0.595 
 (3.05)** (2.79)** (2.85)** (3.02)** 
Gift to get things done (dummy) 0.194 0.181 0.19 0.185 
 (2.10)* (1.95) (2.04)* (1.95) 
Number of inspections 0.355 0.363 0.422 0.353 
 (2.17)* (2.16)* (2.50)* (2.06)* 
Medium (dummy)  -0.054   
  (0.29)   
Large (dummy)  -0.543   
  (2.50)*   
Exporter (dummy)   -0.717  
   (3.83)**  
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Foreign Ownership (dummy)    -0.924 
    (3.77)** 
State Ownership (dummy)    -0.345 
    (1.11) 
Constant -0.409 -0.22 0.254 -0.249 
 (2.05)* (0.98) (1.22) (1.14) 
Observations 306 306 306 306 
Pseudo R2 0.1101 0.1297 0.1164 0.1499 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Annex 2.3. Probit results of Corruption on perception on Tax Administration, 
excluding payments to get things done. 
(robust t-statistics in parenthesis) 
Investment Climate variable Tax Rate Tax Rate Tax Rate Tax Rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gift for tax (dummy) 0.757 0.735 0.722 0.724 
 (4.98)** (4.76)** (4.70)** (4.70)** 
Number of inspections 0.305 0.276 0.344 0.272 
 (1.95) (1.74) (2.17)* (1.7) 
Medium (dummy)  0.168   
  (0.97)   
Large (dummy)  -0.146   
  (0.7)   
Exporter (dummy)   -0.493  
   (2.71)**  
Foreign Ownership (dummy)    -0.511 
    (2.15)* 
State Ownership (dummy)    -0.515 
    (1.66) 
Constant -0.228 -0.241 -0.124 -0.098 
 (1.69) (1.45) (0.87) (0.66) 
Observations 311 311 311 311 
Pseudo R2 0.0812 0.0876 0.0992 0.0978 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
Annex 2.4. Probit results of Corruption on perception on Tax Administration, 
excluding payments to get things done. 
(robust t-statistics in parenthesis) 
Investment Climate variable 
Tax 
Administration 
Tax 
Administration 
Tax 
Administration 
Tax 
Administration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Gift for tax (dummy) 0.857 0.795 0.821 0.846 
 (5.42)** (4.93)** (5.09)** (5.19)** 
Number of inspections 0.324 0.333 0.385 0.316 
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 (2.02)* (2.01)* (2.33)* (1.88) 
Medium (dummy)  -0.032   
  (0.18)   
Large (dummy)  -0.563   
  (2.63)**   
Exporter (dummy)   -0.711  
   (3.85)**  
Foreign Ownership (dummy)    -0.938 
    (3.86)** 
State Ownership (dummy)    -0.448 
    (1.45) 
Constant -0.085 0.079 0.066 0.074 
 (0.63) (0.47) (0.46) (0.5) 
Observations 315 315 315 315 
Pseudo R2 0.1019 0.1239 0.1405 0.1443 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
Annex 2.5. Impact of Red Tape on Corruption in Armenia 
(robust t-statistics in parenthesis) 
Investment Climate variable 
Tax 
Administration 
Tax 
Administration 
Tax 
Administration 
Tax 
Administration 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of inspections 0.438 0.465 0.462 0.374 
 (2.97)** (3.05)** (3.10)** (2.48)* 
Medium (dummy)  -0.177   
  (1.08)   
Large (dummy)  -0.67   
  (3.28)**   
Exporter (dummy)   -0.374  
   (2.14)*  
Foreign Ownership (dummy)    -0.226 
    (0.97) 
State Ownership (dummy)    -0.861 
    (2.53)* 
Constant -0.218 -0.024 -0.153 -0.106 
 (1.86) (0.17) (1.25) (0.84) 
Observations 317 317 317 317 
Pseudo R2 0.0202 0.1239    0.0307 0.0376 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
Annex 2.6. Impact of Red Tape on Corruption in Azerbaijan 
(robust t-statistics in parenthesis) 
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Investment Climate variable 
Informal 
Payments 
Informal 
Payments 
Informal 
Payments 
Informal 
Payments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of inspections -0.625 -0.624 -0.651 -0.555 
 (2.55)* (2.51)* (2.64)** (2.21)* 
Medium (dummy)  0.224   
  (0.91)   
Large (dummy)  -0.137   
  (0.51)   
Exporter (dummy)   -0.275  
   (0.9)  
Foreign Ownership (dummy)    0.254 
    (0.88) 
State Ownership (dummy)    -1.021 
    (2.33)* 
Constant 0.297 0.246 0.339 0.316 
 (2.55)* (1.24) (2.70)** (2.47)* 
Observations 155 155 155 155 
Pseudo R2 0.0311   0.0413 0.0349 0.0668 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 
Annex 2.7. Impact of Red Tape on Corruption in Turkey 
(robust t-statistics in parenthesis) 
Investment Climate variable 
Informal 
Payments 
Informal 
Payments 
Informal 
Payments 
Informal 
Payments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of inspections 0.112 0.056 0.171 0.112 
 (0.59) (0.29) (0.89) (2.21)* 
Medium (dummy)  0.648   
  (2.78)**   
Large (dummy)  0.768   
  (3.21)**   
Exporter (dummy)   0.412  
   (2.08)*  
Foreign Ownership (dummy)    -0.59 
    (0.178) 
State Ownership (dummy)    -0.62 
    (0.34) 
Constant -1.031 -1.424 -1.211 -1.029 
 (7.36)** (7.50)** (7.19)** (6.96)** 
Observations 253 253 253 253 
Pseudo R2 0.0016 0.0586 0.0205 0.0073 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Annex 2.8. Impact of Red Tape on Corruption in Georgia 
(robust t-statistics in parenthesis) 
Investment Climate variable 
Informal 
Payments 
Informal 
Payments 
Informal 
Payments 
Informal 
Payments 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Number of inspections 0.014 0.025 0.013 0.025 
 (0.05) (0.09) (0.05) (0.09) 
Medium (dummy)  -0.313   
  (1.02)   
Large (dummy)  -0.286   
  (0.88)   
Exporter (dummy)   -0.05  
   (0.14)  
Foreign Ownership (dummy)    -0.216 
    (0.56) 
State Ownership (dummy)    -0.718 
    (1.34) 
Constant -0.809 -0.639 -0.8 -0.727 
 (3.75)** (2.44)* (3.57)** (3.16)** 
Observations 118 118 118 118 
Pseudo R2 0.0000 0.0107 0.0002 0.0187 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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Annex 3.1 Production functions estimates 
(robust t-statistics in parenthesis) 
 
Value Added Escribano 
(log) 
Value Added Escribano  
(log) 
Value Added OLS 
 (log) 
Fixed Capital (log) 0.265 0.265 0.294 
 (7.94)*** (4.97)*** (6.29)*** 
Manpower costs (log) 0.697  0.749 
 (13.36)***  (15.73)*** 
Total workers (log)  0.770  
  (21.72)***  
Industry dummies    
Garments 0.754 0.257 0.547 
 (12.92)*** (3.56)*** (15.89)*** 
Food 1.052 0.429 0.890 
 (17.68)*** (4.23)*** (20.68)*** 
Metals and Machinery 0.990 0.404 0.876 
 (18.60)*** (3.47)*** (17.94)*** 
Electronics 0.965 0.212 0.671 
 (6.42)*** (1.16) (6.03)*** 
Chemicals and 
Pharmaceuticals 0.624 0.051 0.534 
 (7.65)*** (0.31) (6.48)*** 
Construction 1.553 0.921 1.469 
 (21.83)*** (8.73)*** (24.27)*** 
Wood and Furniture 1.590 1.004 1.314 
 (27.01)*** (16.51)*** (95.96)*** 
Plastic 0.611 0.008 0.269 
 (8.29)*** (0.07) (3.69)*** 
Paper 0.663 -0.011 0.563 
 (16.78)*** (0.10) (16.36)*** 
Advertising and Marketing 1.254 1.122 0.996 
 (15.25)*** (22.38)*** (60.42)*** 
Other Services 1.180 0.448 1.057 
 (16.86)*** (3.85)*** (23.99)*** 
Retail and Wholesale 1.357 0.864 1.071 
 (18.12)*** (13.40)*** (51.60)*** 
Hotels and Restaurants 1.600 0.834 1.219 
 (19.48)*** (13.24)*** (100.14)*** 
Transport 0.344 -0.364 0.109 
 (5.32)*** (2.42)** (1.46) 
Real Estate and Rental 
Services 2.683 1.976 2.526 
 (47.19)*** (40.83)*** (143.55)*** 
Mining and Quarrying 0.859 0.275 0.778 
 (17.19)*** (4.55)*** (20.83)*** 
Firm’s control variables    
 45
Age dummy 0.199 0.196  
 (2.60)** (2.94)***  
Audit dummy 0.260 0.299  
 (4.13)*** (4.21)***  
National competition dummy 0.291 0.127  
 (4.51)*** (2.23)**  
Observations 212 213 214 
R-squared 0.79 0.79 0.77 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Annex 3.2 Production functions estimates, 
pooled country data 
(robust t-statistics in parenthesis) 
 
Value Added Escribano 
(log) 
Fixed Capital (log) 0.115 
 (4.84)** 
Manpower costs (log) 0.901 
 (32.13)** 
Country dummies  
Turkey 0.416 
 (3.29)** 
Moldova -0.750 
 (6.00)** 
Latvia 0.698 
 (5.93)** 
Lithuania 0.259 
 (2.31)* 
Estonia 1.188 
 (10.20)** 
Georgia -0.118 
 (0.93) 
Kazakhstan -0.404 
 (3.59)** 
Uzbekistan -0.342 
 (2.33)* 
Tajikistan -1.726 
 (10.78)** 
Kyrgyzstan -0.945 
 (8.32)** 
Firm’s control variables  
Not audited financial 
statements (dummy) -0.194 
 (3.17)** 
Corruption (% sales) 0.025 
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 (1.99)* 
Observations 1095 
R-squared 0.78 
Significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Industries dummies were included but not reported. 
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